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Abstract. Strategic interactions between competitive entities are generally consid-
ered from the perspective of complete revelations of benefits achieved from those
interactions, in the form of public payoff functions in the announced games. In this
work, we propose a formal framework for a competitive ecosystem where each player
is permitted to deviate from publicly optimal strategies under certain private pay-
offs greater than public payoffs, given that these deviations have certain acceptable
bounds as agreed by all players. We call this game theoretic construction an Intention
Game. We formally define an Intention Game, and notions of equilibria that exist in
such deviant interactions. We give an example of a Cournot competition in a partially
honest setting. We compare Intention Games with conventional strategic form games.
Finally, we give a cryptographic use of Intention Games and a dual interpretation of
this novel framework.
1 Introduction
Game theory [1] considers non-cooperative strategic interactions among players with public
knowledge of the actions available and payoff structures for the involved parties. Even in the
case of games with incomplete information, the framework of the game is consistent with
those of complete information games. This framework consists of a direct, disclosed payoff
for each player as a function of the actions chosen by all players. These actions are chosen by
players individually with selfish interests alone. It is this notion of rationality that dictates
strategic choices and principles of equilibria.
However, rational entities my compete amongst themselves with a partial disclosure of pay-
offs achieved out of the competition. As long as each competing entity is in the knowledge
that other participating entities might have payoffs over and above the disclosed payoffs,
which is true for the said entity also, it is reasonable to assume applicability of novel game
structures in this partially honest setting. Further, game equilibria should dictate that there
don’t exist players which are being dominantly unfair to other players through excessive de-
viations under the disclosed ‘public game’ agreed upon by all (potentially dishonest) players.
In order to address this problem of partially honest competition, we propose a new game
theoretic framework called Intention Games. Our framework permits strategic games among
partially honest players with publicly declared payoffs less than or equal to actual payoffs.
Moreover, these hidden payoffs per player might change per iteration of the Intention Game
and can potentially result from secret contracts of each player with hidden parties. We de-
fine best responses in this (potentially devious) ecosystem and equilibria as a function of
the publicly observed deviations in actions and payoffs. We give an example of a Cournot
Competition (Section 3.1, [1]) in a partially honest setting. We give a use of Intention Games
for the discovery of a cryptographic key. We also give a possible dual interpretation of an
Intention Game.
This paper is organized as follows. Firstly, we motivate the need of a new game paradigm in
a dishonest setting in Section 2. In Section 3 we formally and rigorously define an Intention
Game, and it’s equilibria. We give an example of an Intention Game through an Intention
Cournot Duopoly in Section 4. In Section 5, we contrast the Intention Game framework
with conventional strategic form games. We give a cryptographic key discovery game and
the dual interpretation of Intention Games in Section 6. We compare Intention Games with
existing game frameworks in Section 7. We close the paper in Section 8 with concluding
arguments and future directions for this work.
2 Motivating a New Game Paradigm
As claimed before, classical game theory consists of complete declarations of possible strate-
gies of each player and the payoffs associated with the actions taken collectively by the
players involved. However, there exists a simple, logical extension of this competitive ecosys-
tem where the collective actions taken in their self interest by the competing players have
implications of higher payoffs due to hidden parties secretly colluding with each player in
isolation. These private increments in payoffs as a function of action profiles chosen under a
certain notion of best response in the public part of the game result in a cumulative private
payoff greater than, or equal to, the public payoff (payoff announced in the public part of
the game). We call this extension of conventional games as our Intention Games framework.
As a first example, consider a conventional game G in a war where the players are indi-
vidual sovereign nations who are bound by a treaty, say T , the actions are armed troop
deployments in a particular geographic region at a certain time, and payoffs are functions
giving a numerical representation of the victory in the battle. Now given an action profile
d for all countries following T , the d can be used as a certificate by each country c ∈ T as
a bargaining chip for troop deployment for alternate treaty/treaties T ′ 6= T between c and
other countries under T ′. Note that T ′ is independent of T and consequently the resulting
cumulative payoff for c is private with respect to G and above that achieved in G.
As a second example, consider HTTP contracts between Content Delivery Networks (CDNs)
and a single Internet Service Provider (ISP) [6], as our game G. In this case the action set
per CDN are HTTP objects sourced by that single ISP from that CDN. The payoffs are
revenues generated from the HTTP applications served by the ISP’s customers. Here again,
an action profile h of HTTP objects delivered could allow each CDN in G to negotiate with
other ISPs it has contracts with, resulting in a higher private payoff. Essentially, h would
be a certificate for the CDN of availability / service record of the HTTP objects it controls.
Note that through our examples, we wish to reiterate that Intention Games is a framework
of mutual acceptance of dishonest behaviour among involved players. A dishonest strategy
for an optimal private payoff by one player might result in suboptimal payoffs for the other
honestly participating players. Therefore, this dishonesty must have bounds as the game
evolves. We formally capture this notion though our equilibria in Sections 3.3, 3.4.
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3 Intention Games: Formal Definition
3.1 Notation and Preliminaries
Let ∆(V ) denote the set of all probability distributions on universe V . We will use the set
notation [n] := {1, 2, 3, ..., n}. For brevity, we will denote the split of a vector w on an index
i as w = (wi,w−i) while implicitly preserving the order of elements. The −i denotes all
indices except i.
Note that we will only give outlines of equilibria computation. The complexity arguments
are implied from classical game theory, with Nash Equilibrium being PPAD-Complete [2].
3.2 Definitions
We first give the formal definition of an Intention Game.
Definition 1 (Intention Game). An Intention Game G is a repeated game given by a
tuple G = ([p], {Ai}i∈[p], {(ui, vi)}i∈[p]) where
1. [p] is the set of players.
2. ∀i ∈ [p], Ai is the set of actions available to player i. Also A := ×i∈[p]Ai is the set of all
action profiles.
3. Each player i ∈ [p] has a public payoff function ui : A→ R and a private payoff function
which can change per iteration vi : A→ R.
It is also the case that for all iterations, ∀i ∈ [p], ∀a ∈ A, vi(a) ≥ ui(a).
4. All players collectively agree on a public strategic form game
Im(G) = ([p], {Ai}i∈[p], {ui}i∈[p]), which is the ‘public image’ of the Intention Game.
5. Each player i ∈ [p] strategises according to it’s ‘self reflection’ of the Intention Game:
Ref i(G) = ([p], {Ai}i∈[p], {vi} ∪ {uj}j∈[p]\{i}).
6. For each player i ∈ [p], there exists a partition (A+i ,A
=
i ) of A such that
A+i := {a ∈ A : ∃a
d
i ∈ Ai, vi(a) ≥ ui(a
d
i , a−i) > ui(a)} and A
=
i := A \A
+
i .
Note that in point 6 under Definition 1 above, we extend the notion of a partition to permit
A+i to be empty. Also, intuitively, A
+
i is the set of publicly deviant action profiles for player
i, with adi being a witness of deviation for profile a.
Definition 2 (k-Intention Game). A given Intention Game G is a k-Intention Game
if in each iteration of the game there exist at most k players l+ ⊆ [p], |l+| = k such that
vi > ui, ∀i ∈ l
+ and for the remaining players i ∈ l= = [p] \ l+ it is the case that vi = ui.
For each iteration of the Intention Game, we call l+ the set of deviant players, and l= as
the set of non-deviant players. It’s an easy verification that ∀i ∈ l+,Ref i(G) 6= Im(G) and
∀i ∈ l=,Ref i(G) = Im(G).
For the rest of the paper, we will consider only 1-Intention Games for the notion of our best
response strategies and equilibria.
We now give how best responses are defined in the Intention Games framework. Note that
these are just reinterpretations and extensions of the Nash equilibrium (Chapter 2, [1]).
Definition 3 (Best Response Set). Given a strategy universe Ω, a payoff f , and a
complementary strategy profile t, the Best Response Set is given by
BRf (t) := {ω ∈ Ω : ∀ω
′ ∈ Ω, f(ω, t) ≥ f(ω′, t)}.
3
Definition 4 (Best Response Profiles). Given the ‘public image’ and each ‘self reflec-
tion’ of the Intention Game, the best response profiles are given by
BR(Im(G)) := {a ∈ A : ∀i ∈ [p], ai ∈ BRui(a−i)}
BR(Ref i(G)) := {(bi, a−i) ∈ A : a ∈ BR(Im(G)), bi ∈ BRvi(a−i)} ∀i ∈ [p]
Theorem 1 (Best Response Profile Dependencies). Given an action profile a ∈ A,
if for some i, a ∈ BR(Ref i(G)), then
1. a ∈ A+i ⇔ a /∈ BR(Im(G)).
2. a ∈ A=i ⇔ a ∈ BR(Im(G)).
Proof. Since for each player i, the best response choices between Im(G) and Ref i(G) only
differ in the payoff of player i, our proof will only consider choices as a function of ui and
vi.
Proving 1 ⇒. Let’s say a ∈ A+i . Then there exists a witness of deviation a
d
i such that
ui(a
d
i , a−i) > ui(ai, a−i). So ai is not a best response under payoff ui given the complemen-
tary action profile a−i. Thus ai /∈ BRui(a−i) and a /∈ BR(Im(G)).
Proving 1⇐. Let’s say ai is not a member of the best response set under payoff ui given
the complementary action profile a−i. Then there exists an a
d
i ∈ BRui(a−i) such that
ui(a
d
i , a−i) > ui(ai, a−i). Also since player i is playing best responses under payoff vi given
complementary action profile a−i it is true that vi(ai, a−i) ≥ vi(a
d
i , a−i) ≥ ui(a
d
i , a−i) (oth-
erwise i would have chosen the action adi ). The last two lines imply (ai, a−i) = a ∈ A
+
i .
Proving 2. This statement is the equivalence complement (for propositions ρ1 and ρ2,
ρ1 ⇔ ρ2 if and only if ¬ρ1 ⇔ ¬ρ2) of statement 1, which has been proved.
We also give the implication of the dishonest player’s actions on the honest players.
Corollary 1 (Fallout for Honest Players). Given for some dishonest player i, a ∈
BR(Ref i(G)) and a ∈ A
+
i , then a is a suboptimal payoff action profile for all honest players
j(6= i) as a /∈ BR(Im(G)) = BR(Ref j(G)).
Note that in corollary 1 as a ∈ A+i , the deviation witness a
d
i ∈ Ai that maximizes ui(a
d
i , a−i)
corresponds to the Nash optimal strategy for i under Im(G).
3.3 A Repeated Pure Strategy Equilibrium
We first give a notion of equilibrium which is captures how many instances of publicly
observed deviations under Im(G) are seen by all players upto the current run of the Intention
Game.
Definition 5 (Honesty Equilibrium). A pure-strategy profile vector (s˙t)t∈[τ ] ∈ A
τ is a
(τ, δ)-Honesty Equilibrium if after τ iterations of the Intention Game,
given that ∀i ∈ [p], ∀t ∈ [τ ], s˙t ∈ BR(Ref i(G)),
it is the case that ∀i ∈ [p], |{s˙t : t ∈ [τ ], s˙t /∈ BR(Im(G))}| ≤ δ.
Computation. We assume that the computation of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for
Im(G) is a given. We give the method for computing the Honesty equilibrium, as an invari-
ant under t ∈ [τ ]. Let’s say δt−1 is the Honesty equilibrium bound upto epoch t − 1. Now
given s˙t, compute public deviation, using theorem 1, by testing membership of s˙t in A+i for
each i. Note that since each player is playing best responses under it’s private payoff, this
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membership can be tested by only finding an sdi ∈ Ai such that ui(s
d
i , s˙
t
−i) > ui(s˙
t
i, s˙
t
−i). If
there exists a single player for which s˙t is publicly deviant, set δt = δt−1 + 1. Otherwise set
δt = δt−1.
3.4 A Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
We now give a mixed-strategy equilibrium for a 1-Intention Game where the deviant player
i persists with his higher payoff vi for polynomially many rounds in p. For each of those
rounds, players [p] \ {i} are non-deviant.
Definition 6 (Deviation Equilibrium). A mixed-strategy profile vector
(s˙i)i∈[p] ∈ ∆
p(A), where s˙i is a mixed-strategy best response under Ref i(G), is a µ-Deviation
Equilibrium if ∀i ∈ [p], E[vi(s˙i)− ui(s˙i)] ≥ µ under Im(G).
Computation. We assume that the computation of a mixed-strategy equilibrium s˙i for
Ref i(G) is a given: first we compute the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium under Im(G) and
then replace the ith player’s (randomized) Nash optimal with the randomized best response
under vi (by keeping the Nash optimal constant for all j 6= i).
We first give the method by which a player i can compute his own deviation bound µi.
Given the distribution s˙i computed in the previous step, it is straightforward to compute the
distribution vi(s˙i)− ui(s˙i), if the functions ui, vi are deterministic and efficient (polynomial
time computable). So, we can determine µi as the expected value of vi(s˙i)− ui(s˙i).
We now give the method whereby a player i (6= j) can compute a lower bound for E[vj(s˙j)−
uj(s˙j)] given a sufficiently long stream τ of realizations of s˙j . For an arbitrary iteration t
of the Intention Game, let rt be the realization of the strategies played by all players. If
rt ∈ A+j , find an a
d∗
j ∈ Aj such that c
t
j := uj(a
d∗
j , r
t
−j) − uj(r
t) is maximized. If rt ∈ A=j ,
ctj := 0. By the law of large numbers, µj :=
∑
t∈[τ] c
t
j
τ
.
Finally, µ := maxk∈[p] µk.
Discussion. It is clear from the definition of both the Honesty and Deviation equilibria,
the game is more fair as long as δ and µ are small. So these equilibria definitions can be
used by each player to announce the terms of competition. For instance, players might agree
on a (τ, δ)-Honesty equilibrium conforming game as long as δ ≤ δ0, ∀τ , for some contractual
constant δ0. As another case, players might agree on a µ-Deviation equilibrium conforming
game as long as µ ≤ µ0 for some previously announced constant µ0. Whenever δ0, µ0 are
exceeded, players terminate the Intention Game.
3.5 Equilibrium Degeneration: Uncaught Deviation under certain Private
Payoffs
We now discuss functional relations where best responses under private payoffs are also best
responses under public payoffs, even in the case that ∃a, vi(a) > ui(a).
Consider the function family {(ui, vi) : vi(a) = c×ui(a), c ∈ (1,∞)}. It is an easy verification
that in such cases, BR(Ref i(G)) = BR(Im(G)) and the deviant (cheating) player i would
never be caught and computing the Nash equilibria for Im(G) would suffice.
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4 An Example: Intention Cournot Duopoly
We now give a concrete example of an Intention Game. We extend a conventional Cournot
duopoly where two firms compete in the supply of a single homogenous product to a sin-
gle market with identical cost functions and symmetric payoffs. Our extended ‘Intention
Cournot Duopoly’ (ICD) involves a secret contract with a mobile but hidden second market
which is in contact with at most one firm at any point in time. Both firms have a symmetric
secret contract with this hidden mobile market which defines a (higher than public payoff)
private payoff in the Intention Game whenever the corresponding firm participates in the
contract in the event of a contact with the hidden market (see Figure 1).
1v1 2 v2
Market M
(u1, u2)
Hidden Market H
q1 q2
H1 H2
Fig. 1. An Intention Cournot Duopoly between Firms 1 and 2, given a secret contract (H1,H2)
with a Hidden Market.
More formally, given a market M and a hidden mobile market H with a secret contract
(H1, H2), C := ([2], {A1, A2}, {(u1, v1), (u2, v2)}) is an Intention Cournot Duopoly where
1. Ai := {qi : qi ∈ [0, 1]}, ∀i ∈ [2].
2. Hi : If H is in contact with firm i, it will take the same supply qi as to M, compensate
production costs, and pay half of the supply from i to it. Otherwise no trade. (∀i ∈ [2])
3. ui(q1, q2) := qiP (q1, q2)− C(qi) := qi(1− q1 − q2)−
1
2q
2
i , ∀i ∈ [2] (payoff from M).
4. vi(q1, q2) := ui(q1, q2) + hi(q1, q2) where
hi(q1, q2) :=
1
2qi or 0 under contract Hi , ∀i ∈ [2].
Note that the price P and cost C functions are expanded inline in point 3. Also −i is a
single player 3− i.
4.1 Honesty and Deviation Equilibria
Using superscripts u∗ and v∗ for best responses under public and private payoffs respec-
tively, it is an easy calculation that the best response profile sets are singletons:
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BR(Im(C)) = (qu∗1 =
1
4 , q
u∗
2 =
1
4 ) and
BR(Ref i(C)) = (q
v∗
i =
5
12 , q
u∗
−i =
1
4 ) whenever Hi is applicable and succeeds.
Note that qdi =
1
4 is a (maximal) deviation witness of (q
v∗
i =
5
12 , q
u∗
−i =
1
4 ).
According to our statement of the ICD, at any iteration of C, Hi can succeed for at most
one i, so C is a 1-Intention Game. Thus, the δ factor of an Honesty Equilibrium can incre-
ment by 1 in an iteration of the ICD if for the said iteration Hi succeeds and consequently
Im(C) 6= Ref i(C).
Also ∀i ∈ [2], µi := ui(q
d
i , q
u∗
−i) − ui(q
v∗
i , q
u∗
−i) = 0.09375− 0.05208 = 0.04167. So given best
responses under Im(C) and Ref i(C), there exists a (µ = 0.04167)-Deviation Equilibrium.
Finally, note that a deviation by player i costs player −i: u−i(q
v∗
i , q
u∗
−i) = 0.05208 <
0.09375 = u−i(q
u∗
i , q
u∗
−i).
5 Comparison with Conventional Strategic Form Games
There is an instance when an Intention Game is identical to a conventional (underlying)
strategic form game. Consider the case where for all iterations of the Intention Game G,
∀a ∈ A, vi(a) = ui(a), for all players i. In this case, for all iterations of G, ∀i ∈ [p],Ref i(G) =
Im(G). Further, the Nash equilibrium will hold per iteration of G and any evolution of the
Intention Game would result in (τ, 0)-Honesty and 0-Deviation equilibria. This can be intu-
itively be seen from the fact that for all players i in any evolution of the Intention Game,
the set of publicly deviant action profiles A+i will always be empty.
There is one more instance where the best responses for an Intention Game are identical
to those of the underlying strategic form game, even when the two games are different (we
have also discussed this in Section 3.5). We give the function family {(ui, vi) : vi(a) =
c×ui(a), c ∈ (1,∞)} for the Intention Game G. Now it is an easy verification that although
Ref i(G) 6= Im(G), we have BR(Ref i(G)) = BR(Im(G)). Here again, the Nash equilibrium
will hold per iteration of G and any evolution of the Intention Game would result in (τ, 0)-
Honesty and 0-Deviation equilibria.
6 Possible Uses and Counter Interpretations
In this section, we give an instance of how an Intention Game can be leveraged to realize a
cryptographic task for a competitive community. Following this, we give a counterintuitive
but relevant dual of the Intention Game, which we call a Selfless Game.
6.1 A Cryptographic Key Discovery Game
We first give an Intention Game where p players interested in discovering a cryptographic
key deviate from publicly optimal strategies in the event of assurance of obtaining the key
at the end of the game. In this case, the deviation is like an announcement that the player
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has achieved the goal of participating in the game, the goal being to obtain the key.
Assuming a familiarity with cryptography [7], let λ be the security parameter. Let poly(λ),
exp(λ) and negl(λ) be the set of all polynomial, exponential and negligible functions in λ.
We will stretch notation by sometimes placing these function classes in place of functions
that belong to these classes. Let the length of the target key k∗ be pλ. Let the ‘key discovery
table’ be κ. κ is a table with 2λ− poly(λ) entries of pλ bits each. There is a hidden nego-
tiator who visits at most one player in each iteration (constituting a 1-Intention Game). A
player i successfully gets k∗ if the strategy profile in the current iteration of the Intention
Game is a member of κ and the hidden negotiator visits i in the current iteration.
We formally state the Key Discovery Intention Game K := ([p], {Ai}i∈[p], {(ui, vi)}i∈[p]). We
assume there is a hidden negotiator H with a secret contract (Hi)i∈[p] with all players. The
negotiator chooses an arbitrary permutation of [p] to visit one player in each iteration of K.
The strategies, contract and payoffs are given by (U denotes uniform distribution):
1. Ai := {0, 1}
λ,
Public A∗i := {ai : ai ← U({0, 1}
λ)}, |A∗i | ∈ poly(λ) ∀i ∈ [p].
2. Hi : If H is in contact with player i, it will check if a ∈ κ. If membership succeeds, i
gets a payoff of 1 unit. Otherwise 0 payoff. (∀i ∈ [p])
3. ui(a) := 1, if ai ∈ Ai \A
∗
i , otherwise 0 ∀i ∈ [p].
4. In iteration t+ 1, vi(a
t+1) := ui(a
t+1) + hi(a
t) where
hi(a
t) := 1 or 0 under contract Hi as applicable in iteration t, ∀i ∈ [p].
Discussion. Strategies for each player i ∈ [p] are samples from U(Ai). Concatenated strate-
gies are tested for membership in κ. Given the size of κ, the game is guaranteed to end in
polynomial time. If player strategies are coming from the uniform distribution on Ai, ∀i, the
probability that any member of A∗i is seen is negl(λ). This permits an announcement of
key discovery to come from A∗i . So if Hi succeeds in iteration t, a
t+1
i comes from A
∗
i . Thus,
(at+1i , a
t+1
−i ) is a publicly deviant action profile with deviation witness as any member of
Ai \ A
∗
i . Note that we have made a slight abuse in the definition of vi by using an action
profile from a previous iteration. However, the ‘feedback’ is legitimate and acceptable due
to the nature of the negotiator’s visits to players (∀t, if hi = 1, then Hi cannot succeed in
iteration t+ 1). Note that ∀i, |A∗i | is small.
Finally, for a requirement that p0 ≤ p players discover the key, the Intention Game K can
run for the smallest τ till a (τ, p0)-Honesty Equilibrium is achieved (we can do a minimal
derandomization to claim pure strategies).
6.2 Selfless Games: Private Payoff less than Public Payoff
Now, we give a dual framework G˜ of an Intention Game G. A ‘Selfless Game’ G˜ is a dual of
G in the sense that for all iterations of G˜, the private payoff is less than the public payoff:
∀i ∈ [p], ∀a ∈ A, ui(a) ≥ vi(a).
Note that this definition of a game where best responses don’t maximize payoffs would
seem counterintuitive but still is relevant: such incetivizations are possible and rooted in
behavioural psychology. For instance, consider a game between a mother and a son in which
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best responses coming from the mother are suboptimal under Im(G˜). However, the ‘ac-
tion profile certificates’ might incentivize the mother to get an alternative reward (for the
mother) from the father, compensating the sub optimality achieved in G˜. Thus although the
mother does not win against the son, she ultimately wins due to a ‘contract’ with the father.
Having suggested a possible dual of Intention Games, we conclude that a rigorous motiva-
tion and definition of Selfless Games is not in the scope of our current work.
7 Related Work
Classical game theory considers extensively models of competition in the form of games with
incomplete information [1]. Bayesian games (Chapter 9, [1]) allow players to have imper-
fect information about some aspect of other players, but have beliefs about those aspects
through some probability distribution. Stochastic games [5] are extensive form games where
the transitions taken by players are random variables. In both these cases, the game theoretic
model is of incomplete information, but can be modelled as a distribution on the uncertainty.
However, Intention Games do not permit any freedom to model / analyze structure of the
private payoffs, which can change arbitrarily per iteration of the game.
Secondly, there do exist studies on learning in games [4]. Again, methods such as fictitious
play are inapplicable since the private payoff can change per iteration of the game. Also no
player can learn the exact private payoff of any other player, only the lower bound on the
payoff deviation of each player through the public information given by all players during
the game.
Traditional game theory considers rational choices and utility maximization as a norm.
However, there have been models for deviation from rational behaviour owing to beliefs,
social issues, group issues under the formalism of behavioural game theory [3]. Even so, the
deviations considered in behavioural game theory occur from eccentricities implicit in the
participating players due to external effects. In comparison, we do not compromise on the
notion of rationality in defining Intention Games. While considering players to be rational,
but partially honest, we propose our competitive framework.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we have proposed a novel framework for dishonest cooperation among com-
petitive entities where participating players can deviate from publicly optimal strategies
under certain predefined contractual bounds. Our novel game theoretic construction called
Intention Games is an extension of conventional strategic games but allows the flexibility of
simultaneous dishonesty among players. We have given an example of an Intention Cournot
Duopoly to demonstrate the implications of publicly devious behaviour on outcomes and
equilibria. We have also demonstrated how Intention Games can be used for the task of
competitively obtaining a cryptographic key. Finally, we have outlined a dual framework of
Intention Games, which we call Selfless Games.
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In future, we would like to explore equilibria for k-Intention Games with k > 1. We would
like to give a similar ‘Intention’ framework to dynamic games (Chapter 5, [1]). We would
also like to explore a rigorous motivation and definition of Selfless Games. Finally, we would
like to build cryptographic primitives with underlying hardness coming from an Intention
Game framework.
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